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UNFORESEEN SIDE EFFECTS: THE IMPACT
OF FORCIBLY MEDICATING CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS ON SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
You are the foreperson on a jury in a brutal murder trial where a
man has been accused of killing his wife and children. The defendant is
raising the defense of insanity. The trial starts with the prosecution
laying out the background of the case. Your eyes wander to the
defendant. He stares into space and his tongue darts from between his
lips every few seconds. He does not seem to be concerned about the trial
going on around him, though his very life depends on its outcome.1
As the trial progresses, the evidence becomes increasingly gruesome.
Pictures of the crime scene, enlarged to poster size, are displayed.
Several of the jurors become very emotional and physically ill at the
sight of the pictures. You observe the defendant, calmly sipping on a
glass of water. You find his lack of reaction very disturbing.
The judge adjourns the trial for the day. In the elevator, you are with
another juror. After a little small talk he suddenly says, “Did you notice
how the defendant just sat there and didn’t seem to bat an eye when
those pictures were up there? I mean, he acted like he was in another
world!” You nod and then the door opens. You go home and have a
restless night.
The next day, the prosecution rests and the defense opens its case
with a doctor, a psychiatrist. The doctor testifies to the mental state of
the defendant at the time of the crime, indicating that the defendant has
recently been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He describes the
symptoms, which do not comport with the current behavior of the
defendant. The defense then turns the questioning to the current
condition of the defendant.

1
All events described in this hypothetical are fictional. However, commonly used antipsychotic medications such as Mellaril and Thorazine, the least potent of the antipsychotic
medications, cause side effects such as agitation, disorientation, sedation, muscle spasms,
drooling, and various other neurological and non-neurological side effects. William P.
Ziegelmueller, Comment, Sixth Amendment—Due Process on Drugs: The Implications of
Forcibly Medicating Pre-Trial Detainees with Antipsychotic Drugs: Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct.
1810 (1992), 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 836, 838-39 (1993).
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The defendant’s doctor reveals that the defendant is now heavily
medicated with a powerful psychotropic drug. The doctor lists the very
behavior you have been witnessing as side effects. After extensive
testimony, you begin to see a picture of the defendant’s mental state.
You realize that he is perhaps not in full control of his faculties.
The time for deliberations arrives.
beginning.

Debate is heated from the

“I don’t think I can convict him,” begins one juror. “That doctor said
he acts that way because he is medicated. I don’t even know how they
could put him on trial—he obviously isn’t with it.”
“You can’t try someone unless they are competent. It’s in the
Constitution. If there was something wrong with him, he would be in a
mental hospital!” exclaimed the juror you met in the elevator. “When
this trial first started, I was disturbed by the defendant’s lack of emotion.
Those side effects are just an excuse. If someone shows you a picture of
your dead wife and kids slashed to bits, you are going to react, no matter
how medicated you are.”
People start to nod in agreement. After more debate, you call for a
vote. The vote is unanimous for conviction.
Approximately sixteen percent of inmates in state prisons are
identified as mentally ill.2 In fact, an estimated 280,000 people currently
incarcerated in prison suffer from mental illness.3
In the past decade, many cases have presented the issue of whether
the government can forcibly medicate a person with antipsychotic
medications for the purpose of rendering him competent to stand a
criminal trial.4
As a result, issues have arisen concerning the
2
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates and Probationers
(1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/mhtip.htm. Additionally,
approximately 7% of federal prisoners, 16% of those in jail, and 16% of probationers are
also identified as mentally ill. Id. Inmates identified as mentally ill in state prisons, are
more likely to be incarcerated for violent offenses than those without a mental illness. Id.
Nearly 30% of mentally ill persons incarcerated for violent crimes are recidivists. Id. at 5.
Further, mentally ill inmates present much more of a disciplinary problem while
incarcerated than those without mental illness. Id. at 9.
3
Id. at 3.
4
See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (articulating the standard for determining
when forcible medication of pre-trial detainees is permissible); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127 (1992) (reversing a conviction of a defendant who was forcibly medicated with
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constitutional rights of these mentally ill detainees, and whether forcible
medication is an acceptable constitutional remedy to the problem
presented.5 The current standard articulated by the United States
Supreme Court is not working and results in the violation of the
detainee’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
Part II of this Note provides the legal background to the issue of
forcible medication.6 Part III analyzes the application of the standards
set forth by the Supreme Court in regards to forcible medication.7
Finally, Part IV proposes two new means to lessen the negative impact
on the Sixth Amendment rights of the criminal defendant.8
II. BACKGROUND
Forcible medication of pre-trial detainees, as well as incarcerated and
mentally ill individuals, has been an issue in American jurisprudence for
several decades.9 Part II.A discusses the medications often at issue in

antipsychotic medications throughout his trial); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107
(10th Cir. 2005) (permitting forcible medication of a pre-trial detainee to render him
competent to stand trial); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (10th Cir. 2005) (denying the
government’s request to forcibly medicate a pre-trial detainee so that he was competent to
stand trial); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming a trial court
decision to forcibly medicate a pre-trial detainee so that he would be competent to stand
trial); United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1999) (reversing an order to forcibly
medicate a pre-trial detainee). See generally Hollybeth G. Hakes, Annotation, Forcible
Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to Pre-trial Detainees—Federal Cases, 188 A.L.R.
FED. 285 (2003) (listing cases where forcible medication of pre-trial detainees was a
significant factor).
5
See generally Debra A. Breneman, Recent Development: Forcible Antipsychotic Medication
and the Unfortunate Side Effects of Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003), 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 965 (2004) (discussing the impact of Sell on Sixth Amendment
rights); Aaron R. Dias, Just Say Yes: Sell v. United States and Inadequate Limitations of the
Forced Medication of Defendants in Order to Render Competence for Trial, 55 S.C. L. REV. 517
(2004) (explaining the impact on First Amendment rights in light of forcible medication);
Bruce J. Winick, The Right To Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective,
44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1989) (providing a comprehensive discussion of forcible mental
health treatment and the freedom of speech); Scott Ditfurth, Note, When Can the Government
Force Someone To Be Competent: Sell v. United States, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 667 (2004)
(criticizing the forcible medication of pre-trial detainees for the purpose of establishing
competence for trial).
6
See infra Part II.
7
See infra Part III.
8
See infra Part IV.
9
See Julie D. Cantor, M.D., Of Pills and Needles: Involuntarily Medicating the Psychotic
Inmate When Execution Looms, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 119 (2005). Cantor discusses the
history of mental illness and the legal system. Id. at 125-26.
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cases concerning forcible medication.10 Part II.B explains the rights of
individuals regarding forcible medical treatment, including private
citizens, convicted inmates, and pre-trial detainees.11 Then, Part II.C
discusses the rights implicated by forcibly medicating various persons
with psychotropic medications.12 Further, Part II.D discusses the
evolving standards as declared by the Supreme Court regarding the
issue of forcibly medicating pre-trial detainees with psychotropic
medications.13 Part II.E presents the application of the standards to
various cases.14
A. Antipsychotic or Psychotropic Medications
Many mental illnesses are treated with medications termed
antipsychotic or psychotropic and the Supreme Court has distinguished
the forcible use of these medications from other bodily intrusions to
which pretrial defendants may be subjected.15 For example, while a
blood test is considered a routine procedure with little to no lasting side
effects, the side effects of antipsychotic medications are plentiful and
much more severe.16 Some side effects that can result from
“conventional” antipsychotic medications include nervous ticks, spasms,
restlessness, and a condition called tardive dyskinesia.17 Studies show
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
12
See infra Part II.C.
13
See infra Part II.D.
14
See infra Part II.E.
15
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). The Court in Schmerber held that
minor intrusions into a person’s body, such as a blood test, are not forbidden by the
Constitution under extremely limited circumstances. Id. See also John R. Hayes, Sell v.
United States: Is Competency Enough to Forcibly Medicate a Criminal Defendant?, 94 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 657, 658 (2004).
16
See Elizabeth G. Schultz, Sell-ing Your Soul to the Courts: Forced Medication To Achieve
Trial Competency in the Wake of Sell v. United States, 38 AKRON L. REV. 503, 540 (2005)
(discussing the different side effects produced by typical anti-psychotic medications); see
also Hayes, supra note 15, at 658-59 (explaining the different side effect possibilities and
probabilities resulting from the administration of antipsychotic medication); Rebekah W.
Page, Comment, Forcible Medication and the Fourth Amendment: A New Framework for
Protecting Nondangerous Mentally Ill Pretrial Detainees Against Unreasonable Governmental
Intrusions into the Body, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2005) (discussing “cognitive dampening,”
a side effect that impairs memory, reasoning, and functioning in complex situations).
17
Hayes, supra note 15, at 658. The Supreme Court has even recognized that 10-25% of
people taking anti-psychotic drugs exhibit symptoms of tardive dyskinesia. Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 230 (1990). Involuntary movements of muscles, particularly in the
facial region, characterize tardive dyskinesia. Id. at 230. Tardive dyskinesia can also result
in involuntary sucking movements, grimacing, and involuntary jerking in the limbs. T.
Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe Mental
10
11
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that these side effects occur in up to seventy-five percent of people who
take these medications and are potentially irreversible.18 In addition to
these side effects, other possible reactions include sedation, decreased
ability to concentrate, dry mouth, blurred vision, weakness, and
dizziness.19 Further, there are some newer, “atypical” medications used
to treat psychotic disorders that have reduced some of the traditional
side effects of antipsychotic medications, though they present problems
of their own.20
Despite side effects that may manifest as a result of antipsychotic
medications, these drugs can also produce beneficial effects.21 For

Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 305 (1997). About 10%
of people who suffer from this side effect experience it in its “severe” form. Harper, 494
U.S. at 230.
18
Hayes, supra note 15, at 658. Additionally, the side effects may also be “subjectively
quite stressful . . . incompatible with clinical improvement and with a useful life outside the
hospital, and can be more unbearable than the symptoms for which the patient was
originally treated.” Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae, Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) [hereinafter APA Brief].
19
Hayes, supra note 15, at 658. Further, conventional psychotropic medications can
cause Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, a disease that can lead to respiratory and kidney
failure if left untreated. APA Brief, supra note 18, at 3. Further, another side effect is
akathisia, an emotional condition that causes extreme irritability, a constant desire to be in
motion, and an adverse effect on the thinking process. Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just
Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right To Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283,
322 (1992). In addition, another possible side effect is akinesia, which can cause lethargy
and cause the patient to feel like he is “dead inside.” Page, supra note 16, at 1068. On the
opposite end of the spectrum, another possible side effect is strong agitation where the
patient feels “revved up” and unable to remain still. Id. at 1068-69.
20
Hayes, supra note 15, at 658-59. Another serious side effect that can manifest due to
medication with atypical psychotropics is diabetes that has developed in patients after one
dosage of the medication. Page, supra note 16, at 1070. Additional side effects that manifest
due to these “atypical” antipsychotic medications include cataracts, decrease in white
blood cell counts, sedation, seizures, involuntary muscle spasms in the facial region,
hypotension, and weight gain. Hayes, supra note 15, at 659. Additionally, since these
“atypical” medications have been in use for a relatively short period of time, it is possible
that long-term side effects may exist but have not yet been discovered. Id. Specifically, the
medication Clozapine, used principally in the treatment of schizophrenia, can result in
agranulocytosis, a serious condition that causes a dramatic reduction in the amount of
white blood cells that can, if not treated quickly, result in death. Robert N. Swidler, Medical
Innovations and Ethics: A State Government Perspective, 57 ALB. L. REV. 655, 657 n.44 (1994).
21
Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 837. However, it is also suggested that the often cited
benefits of antipsychotic medications are actually overstated. Laura Ryan, Comment:
Washington State Prison Procedure for the Forcible Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to
Prison Inmates Does Not Violate Due Process, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990), 59
U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1405 (1991). However, some scholars believe that it is the side effects
that are overstated as opposed to the benefits. John Baker, Tardive Dyskinesia: Reducing
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example, antipsychotic drugs are very effective in treating symptoms of
psychoses by clearing delusions that may cause irrational behavior and
interfere with regular courses of treatment.22 Additionally, antipsychotic
drugs allow for more humane treatment of those with delusional
disorders.23
Regardless of the benefits and detriments, it still remains that the
very purpose of antipsychotic drugs is to alter the chemistry of the brain
to produce beneficial changes in the cognitive process.24 While there
may be some benefit to the administration of these antipsychotic
medicines, the medicines often produce serious, even fatal, side effects.25
As a result, the use of these medications presents constitutional
difficulties when considering the rights implicated by the practice of
forcibly medicating individuals.26
B. Forcible Medical Treatment in General
Generally, individuals possess certain rights regarding their medical
care.27 These rights are balanced against relevant government interests,
depending on whether the person is a private citizen, a convicted
prisoner, or pre-trial detainee.28 However, pre-trial detainees are

Medical Malpractice Exposure Through a Risk-Benefit Analysis, 1 DEPAUL HEALTH CARE L. 799,
801 (1997).
22
Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 837. Specifically, administration of Clozapine, a drug
used for treating schizophrenia, has resulted in substantial improvements in patients who
have not reacted to other antipsychotic medications by reducing hallucinations, disjointed
thinking, and bizarre behavior. Swidler, supra note 20, at 667. Some patients have made
such remarkable recoveries while using Clozapine that they are now able to live
independently. Id. at 667 n.41. Additionally, Clozapine has reduced symptoms of tardive
dyskinesia in patients who were previously administered conventional antipsychotic
medications. Id. at 667.
23
Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 837. Antipsychotic medications, by relieving the
symptoms of psychoses, allow a patient to be free of restraints and makes it possible for the
patient to eventually function in society. Id. at 837-38. Ziegelmueller also notes that the
benefits and side effects vary dramatically depending on the dosage of the medication. Id.
24
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (citing Harper v. Washington, 759 P.2d
358, 361 n.3 (Wash. 1988)).
25
Id. at 230. The Court further discussed other side effects caused by antipsychotic
drugs in general. Id. at 229. For example, these drugs can produce an effect called acute
dystonia which causes severe involuntary spasms of the upper body, throat, tongue, or
eyes, and causes the necessity to introduce another drug to combat these effects. Id. at 22930.
26
See infra Part II.C.
27
See infra Part II.B.1.
28
See infra Part II.B.2.
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considered under different standards than convicted prisoners and
private detainees when the issue of forcible medication arises.29
1.

Rights of Patients

The Supreme Court has held that people have the right to decide
what types of medical treatment they wish to receive and the ability to
refuse such recommended treatment.30 In Cruzan v. Missouri Department
of Health,31 the Court held that competent people generally have the right
to exact control over their own bodies, and one who ignores those wishes
can be held liable.32 While Cruzan stands for the proposition that a
competent person generally has the right to refuse medical treatment, an
incompetent person does not enjoy the same right.33 Furthermore, the
See infra Part II.B.3.
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). In Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan was
in an automobile accident and sustained injuries leaving her incompetent. Id. at 265. Her
parents, serving as her guardians, after learning that their daughter would likely never
regain consciousness or cognitive functions, sought to have the feeding and hydration
tubes removed from their daughter. Id. The Supreme Court of Missouri declined to allow
the withdrawal, holding that because there was no clear and convincing evidence that
Nancy Cruzan would have requested that the feeding and hydration tubes be withdrawn,
her parents had no authority to carry out their request. Id.
31
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
32
Id. at 269 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
Justice Cardozo stated, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages.” Id.
33
Id. (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). The Court stated
that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Id.
The focus of Cruzan was whether it was constitutionally permissible for the State of
Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent person would have
desired the cessation of life-sustaining treatment. Id. The Court held that while a
competent person generally possesses the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment,
it does not follow that an incompetent person should have the same right as one who is
competent to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise the right. Id. at 278-80.
Courts have, however, found that involuntarily committed mental patients have the right
to refuse anti-psychotic drugs. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 840 (3d Cir. 1981). In Rennie,
the petitioner was a frequent patient at a New Jersey state-run psychiatric hospital. Id. at
838. He was forcibly medicated with anti-psychotic drugs and filed suit alleging that
several specific rights had been violated by the forced medication: the right to refuse
treatment in non-emergency situations; the right to receive treatment; the right of access to
counsel; and the right to be free from abuse while in state custody. Id. at 839. The lower
court found that involuntarily as well as voluntarily committed individuals have a right to
refuse anti-psychotic medications. Id. at 840. See also Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D.
Mass. 1979). In Okin, the court prevented the forcible medication of antipsychotic
29
30
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Court in Cruzan acknowledged that the idea of bodily integrity is the
reason that informed consent is generally necessary before medical
treatment commences.34 The Court then explained that a logical
companion to the idea of informed consent is the right to refuse
treatment.35
Courts have also considered the rights of those in a mental
institution to refuse treatment, initially granting institutional authorities
the right to supervise and regulate the treatment regimen for those
committed involuntarily.36 However, a federal district court has held
that patients who have been involuntarily committed to mental
institutions also enjoy the right to refuse medication.37 In cases
considering forcible medication in mental facilities, antipsychotic or
psychotropic drugs are most often at issue.38 The nature of the
antipsychotic drugs themselves is often cited as the objection to
accepting the drugs voluntarily.39 Nonetheless, courts have recognized
medications to involuntarily committed individuals holding that, “Whatever powers the
Constitution has granted our government, involuntary mind control is not one of them,
absent extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1367.
34
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269; see also G. Steven Neely, The Constitutional Right to Suicide, the
Quality of Life, and the “Slippery Slope”: An Explicit Reply to Lingering Concerns, 28 AKRON L.
REV. 53, 54 (1994) (discussing the long-standing recognition by the common law of the right
for a person to be free from non-consensual bodily intrusions and the extension of that
recognition to the refusal of life-saving treatment).
35
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. Informed consent encompasses the right to choose, accept, or
refuse medical treatment. Cantor, supra note 9, at 127. However, the rights of bodily
integrity and personal autonomy that form the basis of the informed consent doctrine are
not absolute. Id. at 127-28. A few limited situations have been identified where informed
consent is not required, such as in emergency situations where a patient may be
unconscious or delirious and a delay in treatment would jeopardize her health. Id. at 128.
When a doctor decides that certain information may cause severe distress to a patient, she
may also withhold decision-making information. Id.
36
Schultz, supra note 16, at 511 n.48. However, the practice of allowing institutional
authorities to have discretion over the treatment regimen began to erode in the midtwentieth century when mental health issues became more prevalent in the United States.
Jessica Litman, Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized
Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1720, 1725 (1982). Issues such as involuntary commitment,
patient rights, and institutional conditions were litigated. Schultz, supra note 16, at 511
n.49.
37
See Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342.
38
Cichon, supra note 19, at 286 n.14. The most common form of treatment in mental
facilities is the administration of antipsychotic medications, both for patients diagnosed as
schizophrenics and those who are not. Litman, supra note 36, at 1725.
39 William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of Protection for
Psychiatric Patients To Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937, 938 (1998). “[B]oth the legal and
medical professions recognize that psychotropic medication in general, and antipsychotic
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the rights of both those who are incompetent due to mental illness and
those incapacitated by physical injuries to refuse treatment.40
2.

Rights of Patients in Light of Government Interests

While the Cruzan decision discussed the right to refuse medical
treatment, the Court’s primary focus was on the right to refuse life
sustaining treatment.41 However, even in other contexts, courts have
found that competent persons have the right to refuse medical treatment
despite the government’s interest in the treatment taking place.42
In Winston v. Lee,43 the Supreme Court held that despite the
government’s interest in prosecuting an alleged offender, the
government could not compel the suspect to undergo a surgical
procedure to remove a bullet from his chest that could provide
exculpatory evidence.44 The Court distinguished Winston from Schmerber
medication in particular, often produce side effects ranging in nature from short-term and
merely discomforting to permanent and life-threatening.” Id.
40
See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that the Court has recognized the
right to refuse treatment for those incapacitated by physical injury, such as in Cruzan, as
well as those who are incapacitated by a mental impairment, as in both Rennie and Okin).
41
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 287 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). The Court found that
Missouri has an important interest in preserving the life of its citizens. Id. at 280. The
Court further held that since the choice between life and death is such a personal and final
decision, Missouri has an interest in safeguarding the personal nature of this choice by
requiring the heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence when a
personal representative or guardian seeks to render that decision over the incompetent
person. Id. at 281.
42
See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). The Court balanced the government’s interest
in obtaining evidence in a criminal investigation with the right of an individual to be free
from bodily intrusions. Id. at 766. See infra notes 43-44, 47-48.
43
470 U.S. 753 (1985). In Winston, Lee was charged with attempted robbery and other
related charges resulting from an alleged attempt to rob a store where the shopkeeper was
wounded during the robbery. Id. at 755. During the altercation, the shopkeeper,
Watkinson, fired a shot at one of the perpetrators who retreated from the scene with an
apparent wound in his left side. Id. Police later responded to a call from Lee who was
wounded by gunshot on the left side of his chest. Id. at 756. Lee claimed that persons
attempting to rob him shot him; however, while in the emergency room. Watkinson
identified Lee as the man who attempted to rob his store. Id. After an investigation, the
police determined that Lee was the person who attempted to rob Watkinson and he was
subsequently charged. Id.
44
Id. at 755. The bullet that the government wanted removed from Lee’s chest was
approximately one inch beneath the surface of the skin and would require general
anesthesia, despite earlier indications that the wound was more superficial. Id. at 757. An
earlier motion to compel the surgery was granted by a lower court judge because the
surgeon testified that only a local anesthetic would be necessary and the dangers would be
minimal. Id. at 756.
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v. California,45 in which the Court allowed an unwilling person under
suspicion of drunk driving to undergo a blood test.46 In contrast, the
Court in Winston found that the surgical procedure that the defendant
would have to undergo to extract the bullet would be a substantial
intrusion into his person and would constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.47 As a result, the Court
concluded that surgical intrusions implicate privacy expectations that
may be considered unreasonable, despite producing evidence of a
crime.48
Other important government interests are implicated regarding
issues of forcible medication, such as maintaining a secure and orderly
prison environment.49 In Washington v. Harper,50 the Supreme Court
found that the proper standard for determining if a prison regulation
infringes on the constitutional rights of an inmate is whether the
regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,”
even if the alleged infringed-upon right is fundamental and would
ordinarily require a higher standard of review.51 The Court reviewed the
45
384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that a State may, over the suspect’s protest, have a
physician extract blood from a person suspected of drunken driving without violation of
the suspect’s rights secured by the Fourth Amendment not to be subjected to unreasonable
searches and seizures.).
46
Id. at 772 (finding that minor intrusions into a person’s body under extremely limited
conditions are not forbidden by the Constitution). In Schmerber, the petitioner and his
companion, after leaving a bowling alley where they had been drinking, skidded across the
road and hit a tree shortly after midnight. Id. at 759 n.2. The petitioner was then taken to
the hospital for treatment when an officer directed the blood test so that the petitioner’s
blood alcohol level could be tested. Id. at 759.
47
Winston, 470 U.S. at 767. The Court considered the extent that the procedure could
threaten Lee’s health and safety. Id. at 761. The Court contrasted the routine blood test
that was in dispute in Schmerber to the procedure that Lee would need to undergo so that
the State could retrieve the bullet. Id. at 761, 764. Lee’s procedure would entail general
anesthesia, extensive probing of his muscle tissue that carried “the concomitant risks of
injury to the muscle as well as injury to the nerves, blood vessels and other tissue in the
chest and pleural cavity.” Id. at 764 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir.
1984)).
48
Id. at 759. “A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence . . .
implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may
be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.” Id.
49
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990); see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (finding that “prison regulations . . . are judged under a
‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of
fundamental constitutional rights”).
50
494 U.S. 210.
51
Id. at 223. In Harper, Walter Harper was incarcerated for robbery in 1976 and was
housed for the greater part of 1976-1980 in the mental health ward at Washington State
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policy of the state with regard to forcibly medicating prisoners with antipsychotic medication and found that the safeguards in place and the
important penological interests served allowed for the forcible
medication of that prisoner.52
3.

Pre-trial Detainees

While courts have articulated certain standards for forcibly
medicating convicted prisoners, courts have articulated different
standards for those detained pending trial.53 In Riggins v. Nevada,54 the

Penitentiary. Id. at 213. During this time, he consented to the administration of antipsychotic drugs. Id. He was paroled in 1980 and, after violating parole by assaulting two
nurses at a hospital, he was returned to a Special Offender Center that was established to
treat and diagnose felons with serious mental disorders. Id. After first consenting to being
medicated, he later refused to take anti-psychotic medications. Id. His treating physician
then sought to forcibly medicate Harper pursuant to the Special Offender Center Policy. Id.
52
Id. at 227. The Court qualified its ruling by determining that the forcible medication of
the prisoner was constitutionally permissible only when the inmate was “dangerous to
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Id. Furthermore,
the Court noted that forcibly medicating this prisoner was consistent with the Due Process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was reasonably related to ensuring
that the personnel and staff of the prison facility remained safe and secure and that the
regulations in place were a rational method by which to achieve the goal. Id. The Court
further explored the procedural requirements that are necessary to compel medication and
found that the procedures that the Special Offender Center had in place were sufficient. Id.
at 228. The procedures in place included a hearing that allowed for the medication only if
the prisoner was determined to suffer from a mental disorder and posed a danger to the
safety of himself or others, administration only by a psychiatrist, notice requirements, and
periodic review. Id. at 215-16.
53
See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (holding that Nevada could have satisfied
Due Process requirements had it made a finding that treatment with an anti-psychotic
medication of the pre-trial detainee was medically appropriate and essential when other
less intrusive alternatives were explored or by establishing that Nevada could not
adjudicate the defendant by using any other less intrusive means); see also Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (“[P]retrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes,
retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted
prisoners.”).
54
504 U.S. 127 (1992). In Riggins, David Riggins challenged his conviction for murder
and robbery because he was forcibly medicated with the anti-psychotic drug Mellaril
during his trial. Id. at 129. Riggins was convicted of stabbing Paul Wade to death in his
Las Vegas apartment. Id. A few days after his arrest, he conveyed to the county’s
psychiatrist that he heard voices in his head and had some difficulty sleeping. Id. His
psychiatrist prescribed Mellaril to Riggins in increasing doses as he continued to complain
of his symptoms. Id. A court found Riggins competent to stand trial while under the
effects of the medication. Id. at 130. Riggins then moved for the suspension of the
medication while he was on trial arguing that the effects of the drugs compromised his
right to a fair trial. Id. With no rationale provided, the district court denied Riggins’s
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Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment provides at least as
much protection to a pre-trial detainee as to one already convicted of a
crime.55 The Court alluded to methods by which a state could justify the
forcible medication of a pre-trial detainee, such as the state proffering the
justification that adjudication could not occur without the medication.56
Additionally, the Court asserted that any trial prejudice that may occur
because of the medication may be outweighed by the need to accomplish
an essential state policy.57
Further, the government may propose other justifications, such as
dangerousness to oneself or others, for forcibly medicating a pre-trial
detainee with antipsychotic medications.58 In Sell v. United States,59 the
motion, thereby compelling him to continue taking the medication. Id. at 131. Riggins was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Id.
55
Id. at 135. The Court cited to its holding in Harper that it is impermissible to forcibly
medicate a prisoner with an antipsychotic medication unless there is an important
justification and a finding that the forced medication is medically appropriate. Id.
Additionally, because a pre-trial detainee awaits trial and has not yet been convicted of any
crime, the pre-trial detainee has a greater interest at stake than a person who has already
been convicted because the detainee will be adversely affected by any act that could
influence the fairness of a trial. Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 844.
56
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. The Court then cited to Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion
in Illinois v. Allen, stating that “Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is
fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and prerequisite to social justice and peace.”
Id. at 136 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
57
Id. at 135 (“Nevada certainly would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had
demonstrated, and the District Court had found, that treatment with antipsychotic
medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential
for the sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.”). However, Justice Kennedy
pointed out in his concurrence that “absent an extraordinary showing by the State, the Due
Process Clause prohibits prosecuting officials from administering involuntary doses of
antipsychotic medicines for purposes of rendering the accused competent for trial.” Id. at
139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy further explained that he doubted that in
most cases a proper showing could be made to justify forcibly medicating a pre-trial
detainee with antipsychotic medication under the present understanding of the drugs
themselves. Id.
58
See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003). For example, the Court indicated
that dangerousness is an appropriate factor to consider in determining if forcible
medication is appropriate. Id. The Court also suggested that civil commitment may
provide another alternative. Id.
59
Id. In Sell, Dr. Charles Sell, a dentist with a long history of mental illness, was charged
in 1997 with mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money laundering. Id. at 169-70. After a
psychiatric evaluation, Sell was found competent at the time with the Federal Magistrate,
but the evaluation noted that Sell might suffer a psychotic break in the future. Id. at 170.
While Sell was free on bail, the Government alleged that he attempted to intimidate a
witness. Id. At the bail revocation hearing, Sell’s mental condition had indeed worsened
and was manifested by such behavior as spitting in the judge’s face, using racial epithets,
and personal insults. Id. Sell’s bail was revoked and he was subsequently found
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Supreme Court explained that if forced medication is necessary for
purposes related to the individual’s dangerousness or a possible risk to
her own health, then the forcible medication can be justified without
relying on the trial competence justification.60 The Court explained that
the facts of each individual case must be examined in evaluating the
government’s interest in forcibly medicating a pre-trial detainee as
special circumstances may lessen the importance of the government’s
interest.61
C.

Rights Implicated by Forcibly Medicating a Pre-Trial Detainee

Because courts have distinguished the standards for forcible
medication of pretrial detainees from convicted prisoners, it follows that
different rights are implicated as well.62 Though the Sixth Amendment is
the focus of this Note, many other rights are implicated as well.63
incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 171. He was hospitalized for evaluation, where it was
recommended that Sell take antipsychotic medications, which he refused. Id.
60
Id. at 182. “If a court authorizes medication on these alternative grounds, the need to
consider authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear.” Id. at 183.
61
Id. at 180. For example, the Court cited to how a defendant’s refusal to voluntarily
take antipsychotic medications may result in lengthy commitment to a mental health
facility, thereby diminishing the risk that an alleged criminal will go free without
punishment. Id. The Court also pointed out that while the government has an interest in
prosecuting defendants, it also has an interest in assuring that the defendant receives a fair
trial. Id.
62
See supra Part II.B.
63
The scope of rights that are affected by forcible medication is broad. See generally
Aaron M. Nance, Comment, Balking at Buying What the Eighth Circuit Is Sell-Ing: United
States v. Sell and the Involuntary Medication of Incompetent, Non-Dangerous, Pretrial Detainees
Cloaked with the Presumption of Innocence, 71 UMKC L. REV. 685, 687 (2003). The First
Amendment is implicated as the side effects of the medication can hamper the
communicative abilities of the medicated individual. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 229 (1990) (antipsychotic drugs have the capacity to severely and even permanently
affect an individual’s ability to think and communicate). For an in-depth discussion of
forcible medication and the First Amendment, see Winick, supra note 5. Constitutional
scholars believe that by seeking to alter the way a person thinks, the government is seeking
to control the person’s thought process and therefore communicative abilities when the
government forces doses of antipsychotic medications on a person. Schultz, supra note 16,
at 533; see also Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that forcibly
medicating a pre-trial detainee would affect the detainee’s ability to produce ideas and,
therefore, affect the detainee’s freedom of speech). Additionally, the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is implicated by forcible medication
because it is more than a minor intrusion into the body. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S 388, 392 (1971) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment “guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority”); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (holding that “the Constitution does not forbid the

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 8

468

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

States minor intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no
way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other
conditions”). In addition to the First and Fourth Amendment implications, the Court has
explicitly held that the substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment are also
implicated by forcible medication. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992). The Court
has found a liberty interest in declining antipsychotic medication due to the side effects
and function. Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment substantively protects a person’s right to be free from
unjustified intrusions into the body, to refuse medical treatment, and to be informed so as
to be able to sufficiently make a decision regarding any bodily intrusion). Additionally,
procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment is also implicated by forcible
medication. Hakes, supra note 4, at 290. Concerns important as to whether procedural due
process has been fulfilled include administrative hearings, notice, and an articulation of
specific reasons for medicating a detainee. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 305 (4th
Cir. 1988). Four specific factors crucial in determining whether due process has been
satisfied are: (1) the private individual’s interests; (2) the government’s interests; (3) the
value of the suggested procedural requirements; and (4) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of rights to the individual present in the current procedures. United States v. Brandon, 158
F.3d 947, 953 (6th Cir. 1998). In Brandon, the Sixth Circuit relied on adherence to the
extensive safeguards provided under 28 C.F.R. § 549.43. Id. at 953. The code requires:
(1) 24 hour advanced written notice of the time, date, place and
purpose of the hearing, with the reasons for the proposed medication;
(2) Notice of the right to appear at the hearing, present evidence, and
be represented by a staff member;
(3) The hearing is to be conducted by a psychiatrist not currently
involved in the diagnosis or treatment of the individual;
(4) The medical professional treating or evaluating the individual
must attend the hearing and present clinical data and background
information in support of the need for medication;
(5) The psychiatrist conducting the hearing will determine and
prepare a written report regarding whether such medication is
necessary in the effort of restoring the individual’s competence, or
because the individual is dangerous, gravely disabled, or unable to
function in his housing facility;
(6) Inmates are given a copy of the report and notified of their right
to appeal the determination to the administrator of the mental health
division in the institution within 24 hours of the decision;
(7) No medication will be administered until resolution of the
appeal;
(8) A non-attending psychiatrist must monitor the individual’s
treatment at least once every 30 days and document the same; and
(9) Only in emergency situations may an individual be medicated
prior to a hearing; or while an appeal is pending. During an
emergency, an individual may be forcibly medicated only when doing
so is an ‘appropriate treatment’ and no less restrictive means are
available.
28 C.F.R. § 549.43 (1998); see also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (articulating
the procedural safeguards and interests that must be considered). Finally, another right,
considered fundamental though not expressly articulated in the Constitution, implicated
by forcible medication is the right to privacy. Schultz, supra note 16, at 534 n.170. The
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Accordingly, this section discusses the impact of forcible medication on
Sixth Amendment rights.64
The Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, is
implicated when defendants are forcibly medicated.65 In fact, the
Supreme Court has discussed how the forcible medication of a pre-trial
detainee can violate a detainee’s right to a fair trial under the Sixth
Amendment.66 In his concurrence in Riggins v. United States, Justice
Kennedy compared the administration of these drugs to concerns of the
prosecution manipulating evidence.67 The possibility that the side effects
of the medication may alter the demeanor of the defendant was
troublesome to the Court.68 The drugs are thought to prejudice the
defendant in two main ways: (1) by altering his or her demeanor so that

Supreme Court has held that a person, under the right to privacy, has a protected liberty
interest in refusing antipsychotic medication. Washington v. Harper, 594 U.S. 210, 229
(1990).
64
See infra Part II.C.
65
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
66
See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (ruling that it was error to order the
detainee to be administered antipsychotic drugs during the course of the trial). “[T]he
concerns are much the same as if it were alleged that the prosecution had manipulated
material evidence.” Id. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67
Id. at 139. Justice Kennedy further explained that in order for these sorts of forcible
medications to meet the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, the government must show
that “there is no significant risk that the medication will impair or alter in any material way
the defendant’s capacity or willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to assist his
counsel.” Id. at 141.
68
Id. at 142. Justice Kennedy discussed extensively how the antipsychotic drugs can
prejudice the defendant by altering his demeanor. Id. at 142-43. A brief from the American
Psychiatric Association alleged that the amount of medication that Riggins was dosed with
could have affected Riggins’s thought process. Vickie L. Feeman, Note, Reassessing Forced
Medication of Criminal Defendants in Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 35 B.C. L. REV. 681, 688
(1994). The Court also heard psychiatric testimony that indicated that under this
medication, Riggins was also likely to suffer from confusion. Id. Because of these reasons,
the Court concluded that it was possible that not only was Riggins’s testimony impacted,
but also that he was unable to effectively communicate with his attorney. Id.
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his or her appearance and reactions in the courtroom are affected; and (2)
by affecting his or her ability to provide assistance to counsel.69
First, the Court recognized that the side effects of antipsychotic
drugs could alter the outward appearance and the reactions of the
defendant.70 Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence that while the
jury could interpret the manifestation of these side effects in many ways,
the side effects have the propensity to create a negative impression.71
Additionally, Justice Kennedy remarked that the physical effects of
medication may prejudice the jury against the defendant.72 This notion
was supported in Willis v. Cockrell,73 in which a Texas court reversed the
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142. “[S]ide effects [of drugs], it appears, can compromise the right
of a medicated criminal defendant to receive a fair trial. The drugs can prejudice the
accused in two principal ways: (1) by altering his demeanor in a manner that will prejudice
his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and (2) by rendering him unable or
unwilling to assist counsel.” Id.
70
Id. Justice Kennedy explained the side effects of the drug Mellaril, the drug that this
particular defendant was administered. Id. “The drugs can induce a condition called
parkinsonism, which . . . is characterized by tremor of the limbs, diminished range of facial
expression, or slowed functions, such as speech.” Id. Justice Kennedy cited to testimony of
a doctor at the trial who listed the possible side effects as “[d]rowsiness, constipation,
perhaps lack of alertness, changes in blood pressure. . . . Depression of the psychomotor
functions.” Id. at 143. The doctor also stated “[i]f you take a lot of it you become stoned for
all practical purposes and can barely function.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Further,
studies indicate that the appearance of a medicated defendant does influence the jury.
Daniel Abraham, Riggins Protects the Insanity Defendant, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 131, 132
(2000).
71
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142. “As any trial attorney will attest, serious prejudice could
result if medication inhibits the defendant’s capacity to react and respond to the
proceedings and to demonstrate remorse or compassion.” Id. at 143-44. Justice Kennedy
further explained how this altered demeanor could be most influential during the
sentencing phase where the trier of fact is attempting to know what was in the mind of the
defendant and make a judgment about his character, if he has remorse, or if he may be
dangerous in the future. Id. at 144. In addition, studies also indicate that behavior such as
passivity, agitation, restlessness, or emotionlessness can impact the severity of the sentence
imposed by the jury during the penalty phase of the trial. Abraham, supra note 70, at 13233. A notable example of a defendant’s outward appearance affecting the jury’s
deliberations and verdict was the case of Scott Peterson, who was not medicated, but
whose lack of emotion influenced the jury and ultimately led to a death sentence. MSNBC,
Jurors: Peterson’s Stoicism was the Final Straw (Dec. 14, 2004), http://msnbc.msn.com/
id/6711259 (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Peterson’s Stoicism].
72
Schultz, supra note 16, at 539; see also APA Brief, supra note 18, at 3. “[B]ecause
antipsychotic drugs may affect a defendant’s courtroom demeanor and ability to
communicate with his attorney, forcible medication may implicate his . . . Sixth
Amendment trial rights.” Id.
73
Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9,
2004). In Willis, the defendant was charged with murder in the course of committing arson.
Id. at *3. The defendant maintained that he was asleep on the couch and was awakened by
69
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conviction of a defendant partially due to his demeanor while forcibly
medicated.74 The Willis Court noted the importance of the demeanor of
the defendant during the trial and how these drugs affected his
courtroom presence;75 in fact, the prosecution had used the defendant’s
emotionless demeanor in its summation to influence the jury’s
determination of guilt.76 Similarly, the Court in Sell also found that the
consideration of whether to medicate a pre-trial detainee requires a
balance of the possible prejudice against the defendant with the interest
that the government has in adjudicating an alleged offender.77
Another danger posed by these side effects, also recognized in
Riggins, is that the defendant will be unable to assist his counsel in
preparing the defense.78 Specifically, the Supreme Court has stated that
a defendant must be able to communicate with his lawyer to provide the
attorney with needed information and must be able to make decisions on
his own behalf.79 However, the known side effects of these antithe smell of smoke in the house; two of the four persons in the house escaped the fire, but
Willis was eventually charged with the murder of one of the occupants who succumbed to
smoke inhalation as the result of the blaze. Id.
74
Id. at *148. The court granted the defendant’s habeas corpus petition on several
grounds, including that he was forcibly medicated without the Sell standard being met, the
prosecution’s suppression of key evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel at both the
guilt-innocence phase as well as the sentencing phase. Id.
75
Id. The court noted that the medication affected his demeanor in making him appear
“flat” or unemotional at the proceedings. Id. The court found that the side effects actually
prejudiced the defendant because of their alteration of his demeanor. Id.
76
Id. In this case, the prosecution pointed out how unemotional the defendant acted
during the trial in order to bolster its case against the defendant. Id.
77
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). The Court in Sell pointed out that the
government interests in these cases are two-fold. Id. The government has a substantial
interest in prosecuting alleged offenders in a timely fashion as it may be problematic to
attempt to prosecute an offender years after the alleged offense occurs if he gains
competence again because evidence may be lost or memories of witnesses may fade. Id. at
180. The government also, however, has an interest in assuring that a defendant receives a
fair trial. Id. at 180. See also United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998).
“[T]he district court needs to consider the risks that forced medication poses to a pretrial
detainee . . . because a drug that negatively affects his demeanor in court . . . will not satisfy
the government’s goal of a fair trial.” Id.
78
Brandon, 158 F.3d at 960 (stating that a drug that negatively affects the defendant’s
capacity to assist in his own trial does not satisfy the government’s goal of a fair trial); see
also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We have held
that a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is impaired when he cannot
cooperate in an active manner with his lawyer.”).
79 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 144 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “The side effects of antipsychotic drugs
can hamper the attorney-client relation, preventing effective communication and rendering
the defendant less able or willing to take part in his defense. The State interferes with this
relation when it administers a drug to dull cognition.” Id.
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psychotic medications have the potential to affect the way in which the
defendant communicates with his attorney.80
Justice Kennedy
articulated that when the government forcibly medicates a pre-trial
detainee with antipsychotic medications, there is the risk that this
administration will interfere with the defendant’s ability to interact with
his counsel, and therefore will violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights.81 According to Justice Kennedy, though the Government has an
interest in trying defendants, it also must consider its interest in assuring
that a defendant receives a fair trial.82
Currently, there are two main approaches utilized to attempt to cure
the Sixth Amendment problems created by the forcible medication of
pre-trial detainees. First, the testimonies of experts and the defendant’s
treating psychiatrists are utilized to attempt to convey to the jury the
demeanor of the defendant before she was medicated.83 This method
provides an aural representation to the jury of a condition that is clearly
visual.84

Id.
Id.
82
Id. at 145. Justice Kennedy asserted that in order to maintain the integrity of the trial
process, if a defendant cannot be tried without involuntarily medicating him so that his
demeanor and behavior is affected, then the defendant should be civilly committed unless
the defendant becomes competent through other means. Id.
83
Id. at 148 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained how the lower court
offered Riggins the opportunity to prove his psychiatric condition through testimony
rather than by allowing the jury to see Riggins in an unmedicated state. Id. Riggins did so
by presenting evidence as to his medication, the possible side effects and how they would
have affected his demeanor, and what his mental state likely was at the time of the crime
when he was unmedicated. Id. However, he was subsequently convicted. Id. Other
jurisdictions have also provided that the testimony of an expert may suffice to clarify any
side effects that an anti-psychotic drug may have on the demeanor of a defendant. See
New Mexico v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296, 1300 (N.M. 1976); South Carolina v. Law, 244 S.E.2d
302, 306 (S.C. 1978). Cf. In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (Vt. 1975) (reversing a conviction
because the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence regarding the
effects of an antipsychotic drug on his demeanor).
84
Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency To Stand Trial in
Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1135 (1986).
Expert testimony is an inadequate way to allow for the jury to comprehend the effects of
medication on the defendant. Id. This sort of testimony results in a “battle of the experts”
with the prosecution arguing that the defendant is only minimally dosed, and the defense
arguing that the defendant is dosed so much that his cognitive abilities have been
distorted. Id. “[T]he only way for the jury to accurately assess the defendant’s mental state
when unmedicated is to permit him to stand trial in that condition.” Id.
80
81
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The second curative attempt is the utilization of jury instructions.85
In United States v. Charters,86 the Fourth Circuit noted that some courts
believe that jury instructions are able to cure any effects on the jury that
the defendant’s demeanor might cause when he is forcibly medicated.87
Yet the court also noted that the demeanor of the defendant can be very
influential and may not be able to be effectively cured by a jury
instruction.88
D. Evolving Standards
To protect fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has developed
standards for determining when forcible medication with antipsychotic
drugs is permissible.89 The Court first considered the forcible medication

85
Abraham, supra note 70, at 138. See Michigan v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 797 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984) (implying that jury instructions should be implemented to cure the
prejudice the jury may develop as the result of the altered demeanor of a defendant
subjected to antipsychotic medication).
86
829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), reh’g en banc, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988). In Charters, the
Appellant Charters was indicted for threatening the President of the United States. United
States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 304 (4th Cir. 1988). Charters was subsequently ordered to
undergo a psychiatric evaluation and was adjudged incompetent to stand trial. Id. Per the
court’s order, he was detained at a psychiatric facility and regular reports regarding his
status were made to ascertain if he had regained competency. Id. After first refusing the
government’s request to forcibly medicate Charters with antipsychotic medications, the
district court held a hearing where testimony revealed that Charters was suffering from
degenerative schizophrenia, an incurable ailment with symptoms that could be controlled
via medication. Id. His treating psychiatrist testified that he would require indefinite
confinement if not treated with the proposed medications and that his condition could
improve, even to the point where he could return to society, if he was subjected to this
medicinal regimen. Id. at 304-05. The district court ordered the medication but, on appeal,
the decision was reversed stating, “Charters could not be subjected forcibly to the
prescribed medication without a more elaborate procedural protection.” Id. at 305.
87
Charters, 829 F.2d at 494 n.20. “It has been argued that the problem of a medicated
defendant can be cured by an instruction to the jury.” Id. See Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d at 797
(stating that informing the jury of the medicated state of the defendant is an adequate
safeguard for protecting the defendant’s Sixth Amendment Rights).
88
Id. “[T]he crucial and powerful evidence of the defendant’s demeanor may not be
sufficiently erased by a curative instruction.” Id. “Cautionary instructions are notoriously
insufficient to protect a defendant against the damaging impact of inadmissible evidence.”
Fentiman, supra note 84, at 1134. “The naïve assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury, . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigating
fiction.” Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
89
See generally Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (presenting standards for forcibly
medicating pre-trial detainees for the purpose of rendering them competent for trial);
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (announcing standards for forcibly medicating pretrial detainees); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (articulating standards for when
it is appropriate to forcible medicate convicted prisoners).
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of antipsychotic drugs in the context of prisoners in Washington v.
Harper,90 which laid the groundwork for cases involving pre-trial
detainees.91 In Harper, the Court decided that the Due Process Clause
allows the government to forcibly medicate an inmate who has a serious
mental illness if the inmate is found to be dangerous to himself or others
and the treatment is in the best medical interest of the inmate.92 Notable
in Harper is the Court’s holding that an individual has a “significant
constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs.”93
Nonetheless, the Court
ultimately decided that the interest of the government was also
legitimate and important, and that the regulation that allowed forcibly
medicating the prisoner was a permissible compromise to reduce the
dangerousness that the inmate may pose to himself and others.94
Relying on Harper in many respects, the Court next considered the
permissibility of forcibly medicating a pre-trial detainee in Riggins v.
Nevada.95 The Court relied on Harper, reiterating that a person has a
liberty interest in desiring to avoid the forcible medication of
antipsychotic medications.96 Specifically, the Court reasoned that under
Harper, inmates can be subjected to forcible medication of antipsychotic
494 U.S 210 (1990); see supra note 51 for a discussion of the facts of Harper.
Hayes, supra note 15, at 660. Previous cases involving forcible medication primarily
focused on individuals forcibly committed to psychiatric facilities. See Rogers v. Okin, 478
F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (disallowing the forcible medication of patients involuntarily
committed to a mental facility).
92
Hayes, supra note 15, at 660. The government has a legitimate and important interest
in maintaining the security of a prison facility. Id. The Court considered a Washington
state policy that authorized forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to mentally ill
inmates who are gravely disabled or who represent a significant danger to themselves or
others. Harper, 494 U.S. at 237.
93
Hayes, supra note 15, at 660. However, the Court also pointed out that this interest is
not absolute but is instead subject to the concerns of the state itself. Id. The forcible
medication of the prisoner was seen as a compromise between the liberty interest of the
prisoner and the governmental interest in reducing potential danger in its facility. Id. The
Court found that Due Process was satisfied by the regulations as well. Harper, 494 U.S. at
236.
94
Hayes, supra note 15, at 660-61. The Court analyzed the specific procedures that were
in place at the facility and when balancing those procedures with the substantial privacy
right of the inmate to be free from forcible medication, found that the procedures in place
comported with the requirements of due process, despite the adverse side effect risks
presented by the medication. Harper, 494 U.S. at 234.
95
504 U.S. 127 (1992).
96
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229) (“The forcible injection of
medication into a nonconsenting person’s body . . . represents a substantial interference
with that person’s liberty.”). The Court further explained how severe the interference can
be with drugs such as Mellaril, the drug with which Riggins was injected. Id. at 134.
90
91
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medicines only after there is a determination that it is both medically
appropriate and there is an overriding government justification, and that
pre-trial detainees are afforded at least as much protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.97 The Riggins Court found that the forced
medication of a criminal defendant in order to enable him to be
competent to stand trial may be permissible if the state can establish that
the treatment was medically appropriate and necessary for safety
concerns.98
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Riggins further addresses
government interests with respect to forcibly medicating a criminal
defendant.99 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy weighed the concomitant
interests of the government in forcibly medicating a pre-trial detainee.100
He determined that absent a showing that the forcible medication would
not hamper the rights of the individual to secure a fair trial, the state
must instead resort to other means, such as civil commitment, in order to
preserve some integrity in the trial system.101 Additionally, he expressed
doubt that the government could ever make a showing that would allow
for forcible medication of a pre-trial detainee for the purposes of
competency.102
Id. at 135.
Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. The Court stated: “We hold that, given the requirements of the
prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who
has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Id.;
see also Hayes, supra note 15, at 661.
99
Hayes, supra note 15, at 662. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the government has
a legitimate interest in restoring competence of those defendants who are not competent to
stand trial, deriving from the right of the state to bring an accused to trial. Riggins, 504 U.S.
at 139. “Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of
those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of
counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right
to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so.” Id. at 13940.
100
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The state has an interest in not only
bringing a criminal defendant to trial, but also to protect the rights of individuals. Id.
101
Id. at 145. “If the State cannot render the defendant competent without involuntary
medication, then it must resort to civil commitment . . . unless the defendant becomes
competent through other means.” Id. Justice Kennedy understood that the Constitution
necessitated that the cost of civil commitment be borne by society so that trial integrity
remains intact. Hayes, supra note 15, at 662.
102
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated:
I file this separate opinion . . . to express my view that absent an
extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits
prosecuting officials from administering involuntary doses of
97
98
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In 2003, the Supreme Court announced the current standard
regarding forcibly medicating criminal defendants in Sell v. United
States.103 In particular, the Court articulated a four-part test for allowing
forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to pre-trial detainees for
the purpose of competency and stated that it would only be met in rare
instances.104 The first Sell factor is that a court must determine that there
are important governmental interests at stake in prosecuting the alleged
offender.105
Second, the court must determine that the forcible
medication will further the important government interests of timely
prosecution and the interest of ensuring that the defendant receives a fair
trial.106
Third, the court must find that medicating the defendant is necessary
to achieve the government interests.107 The Court determined that in
making its decision whether it is permissible to forcibly medicate a pretrial detainee, a court must consider whether there are any less intrusive
treatments that may achieve the same result.108 Additionally, before the

antipsychotic medicines for purposes of rendering the accused
competent for trial, and to express doubt that the showing can be made
in most cases, given our present understanding of the properties of
these drugs.
Id. at 138-39.
103
539 U.S. 166 (2003).
104
Id.
105
Id. The Court explained that the seriousness of the crime is a factor in determining the
importance of the government interest. Id. Further, the Court articulated that each
situation must be determined on the facts of the individual case. Id. “Special circumstances
may lessen the importance of that interest.” Id. The Court gave as examples that the
detainee’s refusal to take the antipsychotic medication may lead to a lengthy stay in a
mental facility and that detention would lessen the government’s interest in prosecution
because the alleged offender would not be free to commit more crimes. Id.
106
Id. at 181. “It (the court) must find that administration of the drugs is substantially
likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial. At the same time, it must find that
administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere
significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense,
thereby rendering the trial unfair.” Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
107
Id. “[T]he court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to further
those interests.” Id.
108
Id. “The court must find that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to
achieve substantially the same results.” Id. The Court cited to amici curiae briefs with
different views on the alternatives to medication in psychiatric patients—one which claims
that non-drug therapies may be effective in restoring psychotic patients to a competent
state while the other suggests that alternative treatments to medication are generally not as
effective as the medication. Id.
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more intrusive forcible medication is effectuated, the court must consider
a less severe method of medicating the defendant.109
Finally, before forcibly medicating the pre-trial detainee, a court
must conclude that the administration of the drugs is medically
appropriate.110 The Court in Sell explained that it will be necessary to
consider the specific drugs that the state proposes for administration to
the pre-trial detainee.111 More specifically, the different side effects
caused by the different medications may be determinative in deciding
the appropriateness of the forcible medication.112
The Court qualified its four-part standard, however, stating that this
standard applies only when the sole purpose of the government is to
force the detainee to regain competence so that she may stand trial.113
Additionally, the Court stated that there are strong reasons for a court to
allow forced medication other than for the purpose of rendering a
defendant competent to stand trial.114 As a result, the Court explained
Id. The Court stated that a court in making this decision ought to consider issuing a
court order backed by the contempt power of the court before actually ordering that the
patient be forcibly administered the medication. Id. Most of these antipsychotic
medications are administered by injection, an intrusive procedure. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
110
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. “[T]he Court must conclude that administration of the drugs is
medically appropriate, i.e. in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical
condition.” Id. For the government and its doctors to be able to satisfy the medical
appropriateness factor, it would have to show that the proposed medications are both safe
and humane, with minimal side effects that pose no grave risks to the patient and that if the
drugs are not forcibly injected, then “the defendant would languish in the horrors of
insanity and the failure to rescue the defendant from such a condition would be entirely
opposed to his ‘medical interests.’” Nance, supra note 63, at 707.
111
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. “The specific kinds of drugs at issue may matter here as
elsewhere.” Id. The Court acknowledged that the different types of drugs used have
varying levels of success and side effects. Id.
112
Nance, supra note 63, at 707. “Different kinds of antipsychotic drugs may produce
different side effects and enjoy different levels of success.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
113
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
We emphasize that the court applying these standards is seeking to
determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary
significantly to further a particular governmental interest, namely, the
interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial. A court
need not consider whether to allow forced medication for that kind of
purpose, if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose.
Id. at 181-82.
114
Id. at 182. The Court pointed out those factors such as dangerousness and
manageability of a detainee provide stronger justifications for allowing for forced
medication. Id.
109
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that it is necessary for the lower courts to look at other grounds for
administering antipsychotic drugs forcibly before turning to the issue of
trial competence for justification.115 The ultimate question should
examine the burden in the light of the articulated standards that its
interests outweigh the rights of the individual whom the government
seeks to forcibly medicate.116
E. Application of the Current Standard
Many courts have had the opportunity to review cases involving the
forced medication of pre-trial detainees with antipsychotic medications
after the Sell standard was set in 2003.117 Some courts have used the
standard to find that forcible medication was appropriate in the
particular circumstances, while other courts have used the standard to

Id. at 183. The Sell court stated that “the inquiry into whether medication is
permissible . . . to render an individual nondangerous is usually more ‘objective and
manageable’ than the inquiry into whether medication is permissible to render a defendant
competent.” Id. at 182 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
116
Id. “Has the Government, in light of the efficacy, the side effects, the possible
alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular course of antipsychotic drug
treatment, shown a need for that treatment sufficiently important to overcome the
individual’s protected interest in refusing it?” Id.
117
See United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1109 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming a district
court decision finding the involuntary medication of a pre-trial detainee appropriate);
United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 232 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that a trial court erred in
ordering forced medication for a pre-trial detainee because of a failure to utilize the Sell
standard); United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005) (remanding
the decision for further determinations after the Sell standard was applied and a
continuance refused to appeal a forcible medication order); United States v. Gomes, 387
F.3d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1128 (2005) (affirming the district court
ruling that forced medication was appropriate for the pre-trial detainee); United States v.
Ghane, 392 F.3d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 2004) (reversing an order requiring forced medication of
a pre-trial detainee in light of the government failing to meet the Sell standard); U.S. v.
Martin, No. 1:04mj00183, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477, at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2005)
(granting a motion to forcibly medicate a pre-trial detainee using the Sell standard); United
States v. Dumeny, 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 133 (D. Me. 2004) (denying forced medication for a
defendant charged with possession of a firearm due to the nature of the crime); Willis v.
Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2004)
(reversing a death sentence and conviction because of improper forced medication of the
criminal defendant); United States v. Barajas-Torres, Crim. No. EP-03-CR-2011(KC), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13232, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2004) (denying the forcible medication of a
pre-trial detainee using the Sell standard).
115
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find it inappropriate.118
The particular facts of each case are
determinative in reaching the respective outcomes.119
1.

Cases Approving Forced Medication

Courts have used the Sell standard to approve the forced medication
of pre-trial detainees in some circumstances.120 The first case to analyze
Sell and approve the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs was
United States v. Gomes.121 In Gomes, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
stating that the Supreme Court did not articulate a standard of proof for
the analysis of the Sell factors on appeal, applied the standard of “clear
and convincing” evidence as supported by the Supreme Court’s findings
in Riggins.122 The Gomes Court considered each of the Sell factors and
concluded that it was appropriate to forcibly medicate the pre-trial
detainee because there was a seventy percent chance that he would be
rendered competent, therefore, the involuntary medication would
further the strong government interest in trying the defendant.123 The
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
120
See Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107; Gomes, 387 F.3d 157; Martin, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477.
121
387 F.3d 157. In Gomes, Gomes was charged with possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Id. at 159. Gomes had previously been convicted of at least three violent
felonies or drug offenses, and was therefore eligible for a mandatory fifteen-year prison
term. Id. Gomes refused to cooperate with psychiatric evaluations, but after commitment
for observation, he was found to suffer from delusions and a psychotic disorder, and he
lacked an understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. The district court issued an
order to forcibly medicate Gomes that was affirmed by the appellate court. Id. However,
while his case was being appealed to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court decided Sell
and vacated and remanded the order for further findings consistent with the Sell factors.
Id. The district court again found, on remand, after further evaluation and expert
testimony, that forcible medication would be appropriate in this case, citing the seventy
percent chance that Gomes could be restored to competency with the use of antipsychotic
medicines. Id. Gomes appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
122
Id. at 160. The court stated that “The Supreme Court did not articulate a standard of
proof to govern consideration of these factors.” Id. Because no standard of proof was
explicitly stated, this lower court was required to determine the appropriate standard. Id.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the court in Gomes I had used the clear and
convincing evidence standard and found that even though Gomes I was vacated and
remanded, the lower court was correct in applying this standard to the case. Id.
123
Id. at 162. The court in Gomes first had to determine if Sell applied to the facts of this
case, indicating that the threshold question was “whether the forced treatment is justifiable
for other reasons” besides trial competency. Id. at 160. Finding that Gomes was not a
danger to himself or others and that his health would not be in danger if he did not take
this medicine, this court found that the only reason that the government was seeking to
forcibly medicate Gomes was to render him competent to stand trial. Id. The court then
discussed what government interests were at stake in prosecuting Gomes, citing the strong
government interest in prosecuting a person accused of a serious crime while noting that
118
119
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Court specifically considered the government’s interest in trying Gomes
to be very strong because of the seriousness of his crime.124
After Gomes, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Bradley,125 analyzed the facts of the situation, considering the medical
appropriateness of the medication, including whether less intrusive
means were available, the likelihood of whether the medication would
render Bradley competent to stand trial, the likelihood that the side
effects would compromise a fair trial, and the government’s interest in
proceeding with the trial.126 After an analysis of these factors, the Tenth
Circuit found that the lower court was not in error in determining that

this interest may be weakened if the defendant faces a long civil commitment. Id. The
court relied on its findings in Gomes I to determine that the crime was serious enough to
provide a strong government interest. Id. Further, the court did not find persuasive
Gomes’s argument that he should not be forcibly medicated because if he regained
competence at a later date, he could still be tried, despite any length of time that may have
passed. Id. at 161. Instead, this court determined that the government interests were
strong enough to pass this prong of the Sell test. Id. Then, the court answered whether the
forcible medication would substantially further the governmental interest in trying Gomes
in the affirmative. Id. The court noted that there was a substantial probability that the
medication would render Gomes competent and that the side effects of the medication
would not interfere significantly with Gomes’s ability to assist his counsel. Id. at 162. The
court then analyzed whether it was necessary to medicate Gomes forcibly or if there were
other less intrusive means that would further the government’s interest. Id. Finding that
other forms of treatment would likely be ineffective, the court found that the government
passed this portion of the Sell test as well. Id. at 162-63. Finally, this court analyzed the
medical appropriateness of the forced medication and accepted the evaluation of the
psychiatrists who said that the treatment was indeed appropriate. Id. at 163.
124
Id. at 160. “In this case, we believe that the government has an essential interest in
bringing Gomes to trial. . . . Both the seriousness of the crime and Gomes’s perceived
dangerousness to society are evident from the substantial sentence Gomes faces if
convicted.” Id. (quoting Gomes I, 289 F.3d at 86). Gomes faced up to fifteen years if
convicted on the charges. Id.
125
417 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005).
126
Id. at 1114-17. In Bradley, the defendant was accused of hurling a hand grenade at a
group of salesmen in a car dealership parking lot because he had been dissatisfied with a
purchase. Id. at 1110. Bradley attached a note to the grenade demanding the return of
$26,000 that he believed the car dealership owed to him. Id. While being interviewed by
law enforcement regarding the incident, Bradley admitted to the actions and told the
authorities that he had weapons at his home because he believed that someone was trying
to kill him. Id. Bradley was indicted for violating several federal laws regarding
interruption of interstate commerce and unlawful possession of a weapon by a person
convicted of a violent crime. Id. Bradley was found incompetent to stand trial, and, after
extensive evaluation and court proceedings, ordered to take antipsychotic medications,
which he refused. Id. at 1111-12.
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forcible medication of this pre-trial detainee was appropriate, thus the
Sell standard was considered met.127
2.

Cases Denying Forced Medication

Although some post-Sell cases have allowed for the forcible
medication of pre-trial detainees, others have denied the use of forcible
medication.128 In United States v. Evans,129 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that because the defendant’s crimes were serious, the
government had an important interest in trying him, but had failed to
prove that the involuntary medication would significantly further the
interest in trying the defendant and that the drugs were medically
appropriate.130 More specifically, Evans’s circumstances failed both the
Id. at 1117. The appellate court found that the lower court adequately examined each
of the requirements under Sell. Id. The court reviewed the findings of Bradley’s treating
psychiatrist and found that they were adequate in assessing the medical appropriateness of
the treatment. Id. at 1114. Additionally, the court noted that the lower court first
considered less intrusive manners in which to treat Bradley before resorting to forced
medication. Id. at 1116. The court then considered whether Bradley would be eligible for
civil commitment in his state and found that he would not as his psychiatrist found that he
was not a substantial danger to himself or others. Id. Further, the appellate court
considered the length of time he had already been confined (nine months) and weighed it
against his potential sentence (fifty years) and found that the forcible medication furthered
the government’s interest in prosecuting this crime. Id. at 1117.
128
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
129
404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005).
130
Id. at 237-42. In Evans, the defendant, a seventy-four year old military veteran, was
charged with assaulting a government employee and threatening to murder a United States
judge after he went to a government office to complain about a late notice on a government
housing loan. Id. at 232-33. Evans, while in the government office, became very loud and
claimed that the late notice was proof that the government was out to get him. Id. at 232.
He indicated that “he was experienced . . . with chemical and biological warfare and . . .
[they] [should] get the situation straightened out with his loan [because] . . . they didn’t
[know what terrorism was] until they saw what he could do.” Id. at 233 (internal citations
omitted). Evans was charged and ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation to
determine if he was competent to stand trial. Id. Evans refused the medication he was
prescribed and proceedings commenced to force him to take the antipsychotic medications
for his paranoid schizophrenia from which he had suffered for over thirty years. Id. A
magistrate judge ordered that Evans be forcibly medicated, and Evans subsequently
threatened to murder the judge who he thought was responsible for his continued holding
in the facility. Id. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed the argument that
the crime Evans was charged with was not sufficiently serious to provide the basis for an
important government interest in prosecuting this defendant. Id. at 237. The court found
that threatening to murder a United States judge, a crime that carries a penalty of up to ten
years imprisonment, “is ‘serious’ under any reasonable standard.” Id. at 238. However,
when considering the medical appropriateness of the medication and whether forcibly
medicating the defendant would further the government’s interest in trying this crime, the
Evans court found that the lower court erred in finding in the affirmative. Id. at 240. The
127
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second and fourth prong of the Sell standard.131 The Evans court,
interpreting Sell, held that in order for a court to properly assess whether
involuntarily medication of antipsychotic agents is appropriate, the
government must state the particular medication and its proposed
dosage, because without that information, it would be giving the medical
staff too much license to experiment.132 Further, the court emphasized
that the treatment plan proposed must be tailored to the specific
defendant so that it can be determined whether the proposed course of
treatment, as applied to the specific defendant, would meet the
standards set out by Sell.133

lower court relied on a report that only generally described the medications that may have
been used on Evans, and did not list which specific drug would be utilized in his treatment.
Id. The court held that, “the government must propose a course of treatment in which it
specifies the particular drug to be administered.” Id. at 240. Further, the court found that
the report relied upon only generalities and was not specific to Evans’s case, and therefore
did not prove that it was either medically appropriate to forcibly medicate Evans, nor
would it necessarily further the government’s interest in prosecuting his offense. Id. at 241.
131
Id.
With respect to whether involuntary medication would “substantially
further” the Government’s interest, the . . . report concluded that
atypical antipsychotic medication would be “substantially likely” to
restore Evans’s competency merely because such medication is the
“primary” way to treat Schizophrenia. . . . The report never addressed
why it concluded that Evans, an elderly man with diabetes,
hypertension, and asthma who takes a number of medications to treat
these conditions, would not experience side effects that would
interfere with his ability to assist counsel. With respect to whether
involuntary medication would be “medically appropriate” for Evans,
the IM report states only that involuntary medication is “medically
appropriate” because “the standard treatment of anyone with [Evans]
condition of Schizophrenia would involve the prescription of
antipsychotic medication.”
Id.
132
Id. at 241. The court stated that, “To approve of a treatment plan without knowing the
proposed medication and dose range would give prison medical staff carte blanche to
experiment with what might even be dangerous drugs or dangerously high doses of
otherwise safe drugs and would not give defense counsel and experts a meaningful ability
to challenge the propriety of the proposed treatment.” Id.
133
Id. at 242. The court stated, “the government, considering all of the particular
characteristics of the individual defendant relevant to such a determination, must first
show that the treatment plan will ‘significantly further’ its interests.” Id. To do so, it must
show that the treatment plan, as applied to the defendant in question would not only be
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial, but would also be
substantially unlikely to produce negative side effects that could significantly interfere
with the defendant’s ability to assist his counsel. Id.
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While the court in Evans denied the forced medication based on the
government’s failure to prove the medical appropriateness and failure to
show that the medication would further the government’s interest, in
United States v. Barajas-Torres,134 the court denied the forcible medication
of a pre-trial detainee based on the government’s interest in prosecuting
the particular crime.135 In Barajas-Torres, the court found that the
treatment with anti-psychotic drugs was the only effective treatment for
the defendant’s disorder and that it was the only likely way that the
defendant would be restored to competency.136 Further, the court found
that the side effects would be minimal and that it would likely be in the
best interest of the defendant to be medicated.137 However, the court
considered the seriousness of the crime that the defendant was charged
with and decided that in light of Supreme Court decisions and in the
context of involuntary medication, that seriousness was defined as “a
serious crime against the person or a serious crime against property,”
and the defendant in this matter was not charged with a serious crime.138
The current standard clearly has been applied in favor of forcible
medication and against it as well.139 However, when forcible medication
is approved for pre-trial detainees, even after the current Sell standards
are applied, dangers still exist that can compromise the defendant’s
constitutional rights.140 Specifically, though certain safeguards are
presented by the Sell factors, the Sixth Amendment Rights of pre-trial
134
United States v. Barajas-Torres, Crim. No. EP-03-CR-2011, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13232
(W.D. Tex. July 1, 2004).
135
Id. at *10. In Barajas-Torres, the defendant was charged with illegal reentry into the
United States. Id. at *2. The defendant moved for and was granted a mental examination
that determined that the defendant was suffering from schizophrenia. Id. at *2-4.
136
Id. at *4. The court noted that “Under the circumstances of the present case, there is
no question that the proposed anti-psychotic medication is the only effective treatment for
defendant’s schizophrenia, and no alternative would restore the defendant to
competency.” Id.
137
Id. The court stated, “in light of medical testimony that schizophrenia, if left
untreated in a patient defendant’s age, may result in a permanent mental disorder, the
administration of anti-psychotic medication would likely serve defendant’s best interest.”
Id.
138
Id. at *6-10. The court considered the possible sentence that Barajas could receive if
convicted, the guidelines of which are zero to six months. Id. at *11. Because BarajasTorres had already served nine months in pre-trial confinement, he would be released for
time served. Id. In light of these circumstances, the court held that “[p]rosecution for
purposes of releasing defendant could not be considered an important interest.” Id.
139
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
140
See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text. The dangers of interference with ability
to communicate with counsel and the prejudicial effect of the defendant’s altered demeanor
still exist despite compliance with the four Sell factors.
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detainees remain in danger while they are forcibly medicated during
their trials.141
III. ANALYSIS
Though Supreme Court guidelines for determining the appropriate
circumstances when a criminal defendant can be forcibly medicated for
trial competency are now established, the standards are inadequate to
protect the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants.142 Part III.A
will discuss the inherent problems with the forcible medication of pretrial detainees after the Sell decision as they relate to Sixth Amendment
rights, including why the current Sell standard is inadequate in
protecting the Sixth Amendment rights of pre-trial detainees.143 Part
III.A.1 will present the issue of prejudice to the defendant by altering his
appearance and demeanor for the trier of fact and how this, in and of
itself, violates the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant.144 Part
III.A.2 explores the impact of the forced medication on the ability for a
defendant to assist counsel in preparing her defense and how this also
violates the detainee’s Sixth Amendment Rights.145 Finally, Part III.B will
present the current remedies that are employed in combating these
issues and why they do not relieve the dangers of violating the Sixth
Amendment rights of criminal defendants.146
A. The Current Standard Fails to Adequately Protect the Sixth Amendment
Rights of Pre-trial Detainees
Even with the application of the stringent four-part Sell test, the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial may still be impaired if a defendant is
forcibly medicated.147 The four-part standard articulated in Sell makes it
more difficult for the government to forcibly medicate a pre-trial
detainee for the sole purpose of rendering the defendant competent to
stand trial.148 However, the Supreme Court made it perfectly clear that
other justifications, such as potential dangerousness to one’s self or
others, may allow for the forcible medication of pre-trial detainees, with
See infra Parts III.A–III.B.
See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
143
See infra Part III.A.
144
See infra Part III.A.1.
145
See infra Part III.A.
146
See infra Part III.B.
147
See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
148
See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. This standard is rigid when
considering medicating a person so that she is competent to stand trial. Id.
141
142

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/8

Likavec: Unforeseen Side Effects: The Impact of Forcibly Medicating Crimi

2006]

Forcibly Medicating Criminal Defendants

485

the end result still establishing competence.149 Moreover, the Supreme
Court encourages the government to seek out other reasons to justify
forcibly medicating defendants other than trial competence.150
Additionally, even when the government overcomes the four-part
Sell standard, the effects of the medication on the defendant do not
change.151 For example, overcoming the burdens of Sell does not mean
that the defendant’s personal reaction to the medication, including
drowsiness, muscle spasms, or tardive dyskinesia, will be any less
severe.152 It simply does not follow that court-ordered approval of
forcible medication will in any way lessen the side effects of the
medication to the point where the drugs will not affect demeanor, nor
interfere with communications between counsel and the defendant.153
As a result, a few remedies, such as jury instructions and expert
testimony, have been implemented to combat the negative effects on the
fair trial rights of criminal defendants.154
1.

Altering the Demeanor of a Pre-trial Detainee Negatively Impacts
Trial Fairness

The potential side effects of antipsychotic medications pose a real
risk to a pre-trial detainee’s right to a fair trial because they alter both the
demeanor and appearance of the defendant.155 For example, some of the
medications produce side effects, such as tics, that may make the
See supra note 130 and accompanying text. See also Sell v. United States, 538 U.S. 166
(2003). The Court indicated that there are other reasons why a person can constitutionally
be forcibly medicated, such as dangerousness, and encourages prosecutors to look to other
justifications to forcibly medicate a person besides trial competence. Id.
150
See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. The Court suggested using other
justifications, especially one that the defendant may be dangerous to himself or others, in
order to justify forcible medication instead of relying on the sole justification of restoring
competency. Sell, 528 U.S. at 183.
151
See supra Part II.A (listing the side effects of medications on persons medicated with
antipsychotic medications, no matter what the justification for administering the drugs). A
governmental approval on the medication will not abate side effects such as muscle
spasms, “‘mask-like’ face,” sedation, or agitation. See supra note 19.
152
See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text (discussing the various potential side
effects and the probability of their occurrence). The medications used do not cure the
underlying mental illness, but only control the symptoms so that the patient can be treated
with other approaches, such as psychotherapy. Ziegellmuller, supra note 1, at 836-37.
153
See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
154
See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text. Various courts have recognized the
inadequacy of a curative instruction in remedying the effect of the defendant’s altered
demeanor on the jury. Id.
155
See supra Part II.C.
149

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 8

486

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

defendant appear nervous or fidgety.156 Another possible side effect is
one that will dull the senses of the defendant, making her appear
disinterested or unaffected by the testimony.157 These conditions may
alter the jury’s perception of the defendant, thus influencing its
deliberations and ultimate decision as to her guilt or innocence.158 It is
evident that the current standard does not provide for a remedy to this
problem, since no measures are in place that allow for a trier of fact to
view the defendant prior to her being medicated with behavior-altering
drugs.159
Another way in which the side effects negatively impacts the
defendant as to her demeanor relates to the possible defense that she
may raise.160 For example, obviously the defense of insanity may be
raised in cases where the defendant has been forcibly medicated with
antipsychotic medication when she has been found to have a mental
illness that requires medication.161 The defendant arguing an insanity
defense will have a tough hurdle to overcome when the medication dulls
her senses so that her demeanor is different from her demeanor at the
time of the alleged crime.162 When the jury is considering whether to
find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, their perception of
156
See supra note 69-70 and accompanying text. Tardive dyskenesia commonly manifests
with involuntary muscle spasms and rigidity in the limbs. Stone, supra note 17, at 306.
157
See supra note 69 and accompanying text. The side effect termed akinesia can alter a
defendant’s demeanor so that he, in mild cases, will appear to lack the ability to have
spontaneous expression, and in extreme cases, will manifest a wooden, “‘mask-like’ face.”
Page, supra note 16, at 1068.
158
See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy stated, “The drugs can
prejudice the accused . . . by altering his demeanor in a manner that will prejudice his
reactions and presentation in the courtroom.” Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Peterson’s Stoicism, supra note 71. The jury in the Peterson
trial indicated that the demeanor of the defendant was “unsettling.” Id.
159
See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. The current Sell four-part standard
allows for the forcible medication of pre-trial detainees, but does not implement any
measures to safeguard any rights that are compromised by allowing the medication to take
place. In the standard itself, there is no mention of any method to combat the negative
impression that the medicated demeanor of the defendant will have on the trier of fact.
160
See supra note 79 and accompanying text. In addition to possibly affecting the type of
defense that the defendant will be willing to proffer, the medication may render the
defendant less willing or able to actually take part in any part of the defense. Riggins, 504
U.S. at 144 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
161
See supra note 91. Justice Kennedy stated that “The drugs can prejudice the accused
. . . by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel.” Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
162
See supra note 75 and accompanying text. The court recognized that the demeanor of
the defendant not only influenced the guilt-innocence phase, but also sentencing.
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the defendant during the trial proceedings may also affect their
verdict.163
Finally, when the outward demeanor of the defendant is affected, the
sentencing phase of a trial can be impacted as well.164 For example, in
Riggins, the Supreme Court found that the potential negative side effects
of the drug Melaril with which the defendant was forcibly injected were
likely to have impacted his right to a fair trial.165 In particular, Justice
Kennedy noted that the demeanor of the defendant is crucial during the
sentencing phase where the trier of fact is making a determination
between life and death for the defendant.166 Further, in Cockrell, a court
in the Western District of Texas reversed a murder conviction and death
sentence due in part to the effect that the defendant’s medicated
demeanor had on the jury.167 The current standard fails to address a
method to solve the problems of negative perception of the defendant by
the jury.168 However, the outward appearance of the defendant is not the
only concern caused by forcibly medicating the defendant with
antipsychotic medications.169
2.

Forcible Administration of Antipsychotic Medications Interferes
with Communications with Counsel

In addition, the current standard fails to address the problem created
by impaired communications between the defendant and her counsel.170

163
See supra note 74 and accompanying text. In one case, a Texas court vacated a death
penalty sentence based in part on the prejudicial effect of the defendant’s demeanor on the
jury. Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950, at *148 (W.D. Tex.
July 21, 2004).
164
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
165
See supra note 68 and accompanying text. If a jury has convicted a defendant in part
based on his medicated demeanor, it is reasonable to infer that the same demeanor will also
impact the sentencing phase of the trial.
166
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy stressed the impact of the
demeanor during the sentencing phase. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167
See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
168
See supra notes 73-76. Justice Kennedy foresaw this problem as he noted that
demeanor of the defendant can influence the jury. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
169
See supra Part III.A.1 (listing the varied outward manifestations that can be caused by
antipsychotic medications).
170
See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. The current standard fails to provide
any remedy for correcting the negative impact on communications ability. By the vary
nature of the medication itself, and by forcibly medicating a defendant with this
medication, the communications are hampered The only true way to remedy this situation
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Along with impacting the perception of the defendant by the trier of fact,
the side effects of antipsychotic medications also impact the manner in
which a defendant can interact with counsel.171 In order for a defendant
to mount an effective defense, she must be able to communicate with her
attorney.172 When antipsychotic medications are introduced into a
defendant’s body, the drugs, by their very nature, alter the thought
processes of the defendant.173 When a defendant’s state of mind is
altered, communications with her counsel may be impaired.174
Some experts assert that the introduction of these antipsychotic
medications can actually improve communications between the
medicated client and her counsel.175 However, for the most part, these
medications are thought to hamper rather than assist the ability to
communicate.176 Once a defendant is unable to effectively communicate,
or when her communication is in fact controlled by medication, she will
not have assistance of counsel, her Sixth Amendment rights will be
violated, and her subsequent trial will be rendered unfair.177
Additionally, the introduction of antipsychotic medications, in
altering the thinking of the pre-trial detainee, may also alter the defense
strategy that she would have normally pursued if not medicated.178 If
would be to not forcibly medicate the defendant, a proposition the Supreme Court does not
seem willing to consider at this time.
171
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. The Court recognized that the possible side
effects of the medications can hamper a person’s ability to communicate. Riggins, 504 U.S.
at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
172
See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Additionally, Justice Kennedy asserted,
“[i]n my view medication of the type here prescribed may be for the very purpose of
imposing constraints on the defendant’s own will, and for that reason its legitimacy is put
in grave doubt.” Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173
See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Some of the benefits of the medication
include altering the thinking patterns of the patient so that disjointed thoughts and
hallucinations are abated. Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 667.
174
See supra note 19 and accompanying text. One possible effect of the medication is
adverse effect on the thinking process. Cichon, supra note 19, at 322.
175
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. While these antipsychotic medications may
rid the detainee of delusions and hallucinations, the negative side effects of tardive
dyskinesia, restlessness, drowsiness, involuntary facial movements, and involuntary limb
movements are still possible. Ziegelmueller, supra note 1, at 667.
176
See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Psychotropic medications can dull the
senses so that the person seems and feels emotionless. It follows that when a person is in
such a state, she may not consider the implications of not pursuing or pursing various lines
of defenses. She may not fully understand and comprehend the ramifications of strategies
or defenses proposed to her by her counsel.
177
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
178
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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the defendant in the medicated state now feels “normal,” she may not
wish to pursue an insanity defense that she would have considered
pursuing if she was not medicated.179 In addition, a medicated
defendant, with emotions dulled, might not pursue the most vigorous
options in a defense strategy.180 For these reasons, the forcible
medication of pre-trial detainees with antipsychotic medications
infringes on Sixth Amendment rights.
B. The Current Remedies To Cure Sixth Amendment Problems with Forcible
Medication Are Inadequate
Though no remedies specifically appear within Sell, courts have
utilized different approaches to attempt to remedy the Sixth Amendment
concerns implicated by forcibly medicating pre-trial detainees.181
However, those approaches are wholly inadequate.182 First, as to the
issue of altered demeanor, the jury is told how the defendant acted and
appeared before medication, and the jury does not get to see for itself the
defendant in her unmedicated state.183 Instead, jurors hear a recitation of
the defendant’s mental state prior to medication.184 Because these
medications have so many side effects that can impact the demeanor and
appearance of the defendant, the jury may focus on the current mental
state of the defendant, ignoring that the mental state at the time of the
crime was completely different.185 The jury may in fact ignore that the
defendant ever was in a different mental state, based on her current
conduct.186 Though appearances can be deceiving, and a person can
deliberately act as if she is mentally ill, presenting the defendant in an
unmedicated state would provide powerful evidence to the jury to

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
181
See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Courts have utilized both jury
instructions regarding medication as well as the use of expert testimony in explaining the
medicated demeanor of criminal defendants.
182
See supra notes 84, 88 and accompanying text. Both solutions are perceived as being
practically unworkable towards solving the problems presented by the side effects of the
medications.
183
See supra note 83 and accompanying text. A jury instruction is given orally and does
not erase the visual image that the trier of fact has seen during the trial.
184
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
185
See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2004) (acknowledging the impact of
the defendant’s medicated demeanor on a defendant in both the guilt-innocence phase and
the sentencing phase of the trial).
186
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
179
180
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decide if that state was only a deliberate effect or was representative of
the defendant’s true mental state.187
In appearing cold and emotionless, the defendant’s ability to garner
a fair sentence if convicted is also hampered.188 If the jury has already
determined guilt while the defendant is in a medicated state, it could be
influenced by those same observations while considering a sentence.189
A jury may even consider the reaction of the defendant to the conviction
itself and impose the sentence based in part on that reaction.190
Additionally, the other main remedy utilized, a jury instruction, is
ineffective in curing the negative impact that medication can have on the
communications between client and counsel and problems with altered
demeanors.191 Simply informing the jury that the defendant is in a
medicated state, and that the jury may not consider the demeanor of the
defendant when determining guilt or innocence, is clearly not an
adequate solution.192 Finally, even if a curative instruction could solve
the problem, in considering that the government has an interest in
maintaining the integrity of the trial process by conducting fair trials, the
government cannot be said to have an interest in conducting a trial with
such a high risk of jury prejudice known prior to the trial commencing.193
Consequently, the forcible medication of criminal defendants with
psychotropic medications impacts fair trial rights in many ways.194 The
courts’ recognition of the constitutional problems is evidenced by courts’
incorporation of different remedies, such as jury instructions and expert
See supra notes 83-85. Allowing a defendant to present himself in an unmedicated
state displays his demeanor when he is not subject to drugs that by their nature alter the
chemistry of the brain. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Whether the defendant’s
behavior while in this unmedicated state is representative of his true mental state is a
matter for the finder of fact to determine. Not allowing the defendant to communicate his
mental state without being under the influence of thought altering drugs deprives him of
the right to raise an adequate defense.
188
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
189
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
190
See supra note 74 and accompanying text. If a defendant continues to show little to no
reaction to his surroundings at the time the conviction is read, the jury may interpret that
as a sign of indifference or lack of remorse and impose a harsher sentence as a result.
191
See supra note 87 (discussing the inadequacy of jury instructions as they relate to the
demeanor of the defendant).
192
See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Relying on jury instructions to cure
evidentiary problems of this nature is neither realistic nor practical.
193
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
194
See supra Part II.C.
187
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testimony, to combat the effects of psychotropic medications.195 These
clearly inadequate remedies could easily be supplemented by new
evidentiary and procedural rules to safeguard the fundamental rights of
criminal defendants.196
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Forcible medication of criminal detainees for the purpose of
rendering them competent to stand trial implicates many constitutional
rights, especially the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a fair trial. In this
section, two “fixes” to the current problem are presented.197 First, this
section will discuss the use of videotape and how the use of videotape
will assist in alleviating the prejudicial effect on a criminal defendant
who has been forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs so that she
can be deemed competent for trial. Second, this section will propose a
new rule of evidence, creating a rebuttable presumption of “not guilty by
reason of mental disease or defect” in cases where the defendant has
been forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs. Finally, this section
will discuss how these two proposals, used in tandem, will effectively
reduce the dangers of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
violation.
A. Using Videotape Evidence of the Defendant’s Behavior Before Forcible
Medication
No detailed procedure for videotaping a pretrial detainee prior to
forcible medication has been proposed or implemented. The following
section will describe a new rule of criminal procedure, detailing methods
regarding the videotaping of a criminal defendant prior to forcible
medication with psychotropic medications, to ensure that the evidence is
an accurate representation of the demeanor of the defendant.

See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
197
Note, the problem of ineffective communication with counsel is much more
problematic to solve than the issue of the defendant’s demeanor. By the very nature of the
act of medicating the defendant, the communications are compromised and the Sixth
Amendment rights of the defendant are implicated. The only viable solution to the
communications aspect would be to halt the practice of forcibly medicating pre-trial
detainees, a solution that the Supreme Court seems unwilling to consider at this point. See
Sell v. United States, 538 U.S. 166 (2003) (detailing a four-part standard for permitting
forcible medication of pre-trial detainees). The Contribution in this Note provides a
mechanism for lessening the impact of the altered demeanor of the defendant, for which a
possible and realistic solution exists.
195
196
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A New Rule of Criminal Procedure
Once a court has ordered the forcible medication of a criminal
defendant for the purpose of rendering him competent to stand
trial, the defendant will have the option to be videotaped such
that his unmedicated demeanor and behavior can be presented
to the jury during the trial. In order to ensure that the tape
presented to the jury is an accurate representation of the
demeanor of the defendant, the following procedural
safeguards must be followed:
1. The tape shall be recorded by a court appointed person who
is capable of swearing in witnesses. The session shall be
treated as if it were a formal deposition.
2. Both the prosecution and the defense counsel shall be
present at the videotaping.
3. The videotaping shall consist of two parts.
(a) A question and answer session with a neutral
psychiatrist. The question and answer period
duration shall be at the discretion of the psychiatrist;
and
(b) A taping the defendant’s behavior and demeanor
while the defendant is alone for a duration of at least
fifteen minutes but no longer than thirty minutes.
4. After the taping is completed, two copies will be made from
the source tape, with one copy being distributed to each
counsel, and the source tape being retained by the court.
5. When the time for presenting the tape arrives at trial, it
will be viewed in its entirety and from the source tape only.
Neither party will have the option to present an edited version
of the tape for the trier of fact.

2.

Commentary

One of the most significant problems with forcibly medicating a
criminal detainee with psychotropic medications is that the side effects
of the medication alter not only the thinking patterns of the defendant,
but also produce detrimental physical reactions.198 If a jury is explicitly
told of the medication that the defendant is taking and the side effects
that it may produce, it is possible that the jury will understand that the
defendant is not in her normal state. However, by producing videotape
198
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that can show the trier of fact the unmedicated state of the defendant, the
jury will see for themselves how the defendant appeared not only before
medication, but also at the time of the alleged crime. Since the
prosecution has already been able to forcibly take away the “in-person”
evidence by medicating the defendant, the next best alternative would be
videotape.
With videotape, there is always a concern that it will be altered so
that the true depictions of the events on the tape are not presented. By
implementing the aforementioned procedures, the opportunities to alter
crucial evidence are reduced. First, by requiring a court officer to be
present, the court itself oversees the process. This court officer will
witness the entire event, and if alterations are made, the officer should
testify to such alteration. Second, with the court retaining the source
tape and the source tape being the only tape allowed for viewing at the
trial, the parties will not have a chance to edit the tape to eliminate any
damaging statements that the defendant may have made during the
examination. Finally, with the tape being shown in its entirety, or not at
all, the jury will get a full picture of the defendant’s demeanor without
any editing.
Videotape alone will not provide a solution to the problem of jury
bias that is presented by forcible medication of criminal detainees with
psychotropic medications. The jury will indeed see a visual
representation of the true demeanor of the defendant, but this alone is
not enough to cure the defect in the entire process. Expert testimony
corroborating not only what is on the videotape, but also other
observations of the defendant would aid in presenting to the jury an
accurate representation of the defendant’s unmedicated mental state.
Along with the expert testimony and videotape, additional safeguards
are needed from the court itself, to ensure that the trier of fact is fully
aware of the defendant’s true demeanor and mental state.
B. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence: An Inference of Incompetence
Because videotape alone will provide an inadequate solution to the
problems created by forcibly medicating criminal detainees with
psychotropic medications, an additional component is necessary to
further remedy the Sixth Amendment concerns raised by forcible
medication. Jury instructions alone are not adequate; something with
more force is necessary to stress to the trier of fact that a medicated
defendant is competent to stand trial only because of this medication. To
do this, a new rule of evidence is called for.
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The new rule, with text set out below, creates an inference that the
defendant lacked the adequate mens rea to commit the crime because the
government has met the requirements to forcibly medicate that person to
stand trial. Though this rule is proposed as a Federal Rule of Evidence,
states would have the option of adopting this rule as written, with
modifications, or not at all. Below, this Note sets out the text of the
proposed new rule, followed by a proposed comment by the Advisory
Committee and an explanation of how this rule, in tandem with
videotape and other remedies, will further assist in resolving the Sixth
Amendment concerns raised by forcibly medicating a criminal detainee
with psychotropic medications.
1.

Proposed Rule
Rule XXX. Inferences in Criminal Proceedings Wherein the
Defendant Has Been Forcibly Medicated with Antipsychotic
or Psychotropic Medications.
In all criminal actions where the defendant has been forcibly
medicated with psychotropic or antipsychotic medications, an
inference will be established that the defendant, incompetent to
stand trial without medication, also lacked competence at the
time the crime was committed, only if the defendant was also
in an unmedicated state at the time the alleged crime was
committed. The prosecution will be afforded the opportunity
to rebut this inference by producing clear and convincing
evidence that despite the fact that the defendant is now in a
state that requires medication to establish competency, the
defendant had the requisite mens rea at the time of the crime.
In the case of a jury trial, the jury will be instructed that the
defendant has been medicated against her will to establish trial
competence, and will be informed of the medical diagnosis of
the defendant. The jury will be told that they may infer that
because of the forcible medication of the defendant, that she
was not legally responsible for her actions at the time the
crime was committed, if the prosecution is unable to rebut the
inference at trial.

2.

Proposed Comment
The purpose of this Rule is to protect the Sixth
Amendment fair trial rights of a criminal defendant in the
particular circumstance where the defendant has been
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medicated against her will with psychotropic drugs for the
purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.
The medical and legal communities, including the Supreme
Court, have acknowledged the side effects of psychotropic
drugs. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). By
affording the defendant this inference, the disadvantages that
are imposed on her by this medication, though not completely
eradicated, will be substantially reduced and it will be more
likely that the defendant will receive a fair trial.
Rule XXX is to be applied in very narrow circumstances.
This rule is to be applied only when the defendant has been
forcibly medicated against her will with psychotropic or
antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering the
accused competent to stand trial. Upon request of the
defendant who has been so medicated, the judge must give
instruction to the jury as to the inference as well as inform the
jury of the defendant’s medical diagnosis and that the
defendant would not be able to stand trial without the
medication.
This rule creates a permissive inference, not a
presumption, therefore not interfering with the guarantee to a
trial by jury found in the Sixth Amendment. This Rule is seen
as a balancing factor to counteract the disadvantages, such as
altered demeanor and impairment of communications with
counsel, that the defendant will be under when forcibly
medicated.
3.

Commentary

Creating a presumption in a criminal trial can be problematic as the
Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a jury
trial.199 However, this rule creates a permissive inference that the jury
may find that the defendant was not competent by the fact that the
prosecution has forcibly medicated her. Ultimately, it is for the jury to
determine whether the defendant was culpable for the offense with
which she is charged. Further, this inference is protective of the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by creating an inference in the
defendant’s favor as opposed to providing a presumption in the
government’s favor.
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Showing a videotape of the defendant in an unmedicated state,
along with expert testimony, can only go so far in allaying the concerns
caused by forcible medication. By creating this rule of evidence, the jury
will be informed before deliberation that the defendant’s current state is
not representative of her unmedicated state. This instruction further
bolsters the idea that the medications alter the demeanor of the
defendant. The judge instructing the jury on this very matter will further
allow the jury to consider the implications of the medication and how it
has impacted the defendant’s demeanor. When the videotaped evidence
is coupled with the inference, the defendant has a much better chance of
receiving a fair trial.
Additionally, this inference contains many caveats: the defendant
must not have been medicated at the time the alleged crime was
committed and the prosecution may rebut the inference. If the
defendant was similarly medicated at the time the crime was allegedly
committed, the jury will not be instructed on the inference, as it is not
necessary. The demeanor and mental state of the defendant at the time
of trial would then be representative of the mental state of the defendant
at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Further, the prosecution
will have the opportunity to show the mental state of the defendant at
the time of the alleged crime. If the jury finds that the defendant had the
requisite mens rea at the time of the crime despite this inference, then the
defendant has received as fair of a trial as possible while being forcibly
medicated.
Some solutions have already been implemented to correct the
inherent Sixth Amendment violations in forcibly medicating pre-trial
detainees for the purpose of trial competence, and these solutions are a
good start.200 However, with the addition of both videotaping the
defendant in an unmedicated state and a rebuttable inference of
incompetence, the defendant will be afforded more protection of her
fundamental rights.
Though these two new protections do not
completely remedy the problem, they assist in the recovery of the
defendant’s guaranteed Sixth Amendment protections.
V. CONCLUSION
Flashback to jury deliberations in the trial on which you serve as the
foreperson. Instead of simply hearing a doctor tell you and your fellow
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jurors about the defendant’s mental state before his medication, the
defense presents a videotape of the defendant before he was medicated.
The person in the courtroom seems to be a totally different person than
the one on the tape. His incoherent answers to the psychiatrist’s
questions, his pacing and inability to stay still, and his seemingly wild
tale of how his wife and children were out to get him made a substantial
impression on the jury. After the judge gives the instructions,
deliberations begin, taking an entirely different direction. This time, the
jury is unanimous once again, but the defendant instead will be getting
the mental treatment he needs at a psychiatric facility, instead of prison
confinement.
Forcibly medicating a criminal detainee for the purposes of
rendering her competent to stand trial presents many constitutional
issues. Most notably, the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a fair trial has
been trampled. Not only is the ability to communicate with counsel
damaged, but the very demeanor of the defendant is altered, causing the
jury to potentially view the defendant in an exceedingly negative
manner.
The ultimate remedy to this problem would be for the Supreme
Court to recognize that forcibly medicating a criminal defendant violates
that defendant’s constitutional rights. However, the Court has seemingly
decided otherwise by providing criteria allowing this process to occur.
To combat the negative effects of this process, two bandages can be
applied to patch the problems caused by forcible medication. First,
videotaping a defendant under controlled conditions prior to forcibly
medicating the defendant can provide the trier of fact with a visual
representation of the true demeanor of the defendant. Second, by
instituting a presumption that a forcibly medicated defendant did not
have the requisite mens rea at the time of the alleged crime, the trier of
fact will be forced to examine more closely not only the side effects of the
medication but also the state of mind of the defendant. These two
solutions, used alone or in tandem, would improve the current standards
in place under Sell.
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